Volume 2 - Issue 1 – 2
Private Two-Party Set Intersection Protocol in Rational Model
- Atsuko Miyaji
School of Information Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Ishikawa, Japan.
miyaji@jaist.ac.jp
- Mohammad Shahriar Rahman
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Asia Pacific, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
shahriar.rahman@uap-bd.edu
Keywords: Privacy, Set Intersection, Rational Cryptography, Computational Nash Equilibrium
Abstract
Many data mining algorithms use privacy preserving set intersection operations. Private set op-
erations have considered semi-honest and malicious adversarial models in cryptographic settings.
Protocols in semi-honest model, requiring light computations, provide weak security. Protocols in
malicious model guarantee strong security at the price of expensive computations like homomor-
phic encryption and zero-knowledge proof. However, practical implementations require robust and
efficient protocols. In this paper, we build efficient and private set intersection avoiding the use of
expensive tools like homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proof. Our proposed set intersec-
tion protocol is constructed in game-theoretic model. In our model, the parties are viewed as rational
whereby they are assumed (only) to act in their self-interest. Our protocol satisfies computational
Nash equilibrium.